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EQUAL SEPARATION: UNDERSTANDING THE RELI·
GION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT.t Edited by Paul J. Weber.2 Foreword by Martin E. Marty.3 New
York: Greenwood Press. 1990. Pp. 180. $39.95.
ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY.4 Edited by James Davison
Hunters and Os Guinness.6 Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1990. Pp. 168. $22.95.

Steven D. Smith 1
These two collections of essays attempt to revive, respectively,
an old idea and a still older idea. The old idea, proposed by Philip
Kurland three decades ago, is that the first amendment's religion
clauses work together to deny religion any special legal treatment
either for good or ill. Government is forbidden, as Kurland put it,
to use religion as a basis of classification either for conferring benefits or imposing burdens. The older idea, manifest in our Republic
since the time of the Founding but less evident in more recent discourse, points to a contrary conclusion; it proposes that religion has
a special place and essential function in shaping the public philosophy of our civic order. In this instance, as in so much else, the older
idea turns out to be the more timely and interesting.
I
It has often been noted that Kurland's basic idea has a paraI. This collection consists of the foliowing essays: Paul J. Weber, Neutrality and First
Amendment Interpretation; Dean M. Kelley, "Strict Neutrality" and the Free Exercise of Religion; James M. Dunn, Neutrality and the Establishment Clause; Stephen V. Monsma, The
Neutrality Pn·nciple and a Pluralist Concept of Accommodation; William R. Marty, To Favor
Neither Religion Nor Nonreligion: Schools in a Pluralist Society; and Robert M. Healey,
Thomas Jefferson's "Wall": Absolute or Serpentine?.
2. Distinguished Teaching Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, University of Louisville.
3. Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor of the History of Modem Christianity, University of Chicago.
4. This collection consists of the following essays: William Lee Miller, The Moral
Project of the American Founders; Harold J. Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of
the Modern State; James Davison Hunter, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of Modern
Pluralism; Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?; Charles Taylor,
Religion in a Free Society; and Peter L. Berger, Afterword.
5. Professor of Sociology and Religious Studies, University of Virginia.
6. Executive Director, Williamsburg Charter Foundation.
7. Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
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doxical-some would say perverse-quality: It insists that when the
first amendment singles out religion for special constitutional treatment of some kind, what the amendment really means is that religion cannot receive special legal treatment. This paradox is not
necessarily vitiating. After all, other interests and institutions can
receive special legal treatment (special subsidies, special burdens,
and so forth); so one might argue that government does treat religion specially precisely by singling it out for mandatory non-special
status. Nonetheless, its facial perversity might lead one to suspect
that Kurland's idea provides a less than promising path to a more
coherent understanding of constitutional religious freedom. And if
one does harbor that suspicion, Paul Weber's book will do nothing
to dispel it.
Weber complains in his Preface that the Kurland position,
which he designates with the label of "equal separation," has been
summarily dismissed by scholars and judges with "very little serious
analysis"; the purpose of his book, therefore, is to assess the position "in a more focused manner." Given this prelude, what follows
is quite a surprise. Weber's essay attempting to rehabilitate the
Kurland position consists of thirteen pages of text. Of these, almost
eight pages are devoted to introduction, definitions of alternative
positions, and general historical background, leaving about five
pages for the promised "serious" and "focused" analysis of the
equal separation position. Weber notes, and tries to rebut, five major objections to this position; in most instances both the objection
and its supposed refutation are presented within the space of a single paragraph. In short, the chasm dividing what is promised from
what is delivered is immense.
Worse yet, in his efforts to rehabilitate the Kurland position,
Weber in fact deprives it of its principal virtue-its apparent simplicity. For example, one common criticism of Kurland has been
that his view would eliminate the possibility of so-called free exercise exemptions, which have offered a way to protect the rights of
conscience of, for example, religious objectors to military service or
Amish parents who decline to send their children to public high
schools. 8 Faced with this objection, a faithful follower of Kurland
would presumably just bite the bullet and agree that such exemptions, because they use a religious classification to bestow a legal
benefit, are unconstitutional. But Weber dislikes this outcome, it
8. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990), appears for practical purposes to eliminate the possibility of constitutionally required free exercise exemptions, but the decision leaves open the possibility of exemptions
granted by legislatures.
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seems; consequently, he suggests that when a facially neutral law
has an adverse impact on religion, the law should be subjected to
"strict scrutiny" and invalidated unless the state meets a heavy burden of justification.
Although Weber tosses off this concession almost casually, it in
fact amounts to a drastic deviation from both the logic and the simplicity of Kurland's position. And in dealing with other constitutional problems, such as the issue of including religious institutions
in state-funded public programs, Weber offers laundry lists of principles or criteria for managing such problems. These criteria are
often sensible enough in their own right, but they typically have no
discernible relation to Kurland's basic idea. In the end, it is very
hard to tell how much of Kurland is actually left. But the elegance
and seeming simplicity of his position have clearly been sacrificed.
In offering these criticisms, I do not mean to suggest that
Weber's book is utterly without redeeming value. In fact, the book
succeeds in being helpful and interesting roughly to the same extent-which is considerable-that it fails in achieving its ostensible
purpose. For example, Dean Kelley's criticisms of equal separation
are thorough and thoughtful. (Weber protests that Kelley has attacked the original Kurland position, not Weber's rehabilitated version. But given the sketchy and confused quality of the newer
version, it seems that Kelley had little choice.) The essays by Stephen Monsma, dealing with issues of neutrality and pluralism, and
by William Marty, disc~ssing secularism in the school curriculum,
are also insightful.
Indeed, Weber himself has perceptive and sensible things to
say when he is responding to contributors' discussions of issues
other than equal separation. For instance, he cogently tempers
James Dunn's oration invoking selected Jeffersonian rhetoric in
support of a "strict separation" position. (Dunn's contribution is
noteworthy in its own right, I might add, principally because it
shows that the devotees of "strict separation" are not going to be
discouraged by anything so trivial as decisive historical evidence
contradicting their position.)
In sum, Equal Separation is a book worth looking at. Just
don't expect much positive illumination about "equal separation." 9
II

Articles of Faith fits into a body of recent work that seeks to
9. For a more serious and focused attempt to revive Kurland's position, see Mark
Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 373.
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revive the notion that our Republic requires a public philosophy,
and that religion must be a major contributor to that philosophy.
In part because of its venerable historical pedigree, this notion
seems a potentially promising source of insight. In addition, the
contributors to Articles of Faith include scholars of the first rank,
including Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Harold Berman, and Peter Berger. These features--excellent scholars exploring a perennially interesting idea---create high expectations for the book.
Such expectations are at least partly fulfilled. The essays in the
book are generally scholarly and perspicacious. The chapters by
Taylor and Sandel provide short but lucid discussions of the relation of religion to ideals of community, public virtue, and civic freedom. Berger's afterword usefully describes the significance of
religion and religious freedom in shoring up the more general conception of limited government against an encroaching statism.
The essays also generally exhibit an admirable balance, eschewing partisan advocacy. James Davison Hunter's effort to sort
out and assess the various claims that surround the divisive issue of
"secular humanism" is as careful and balanced as any treatment I
recall reading. And William Lee Miller attempts to steer a middle
course between interpretations that present the Founding either as a
secular and secularizing revolution or as the initiation of a "Christian nation."
But like any book, this one has its shortcomings. In a sense,
these grow out of its virtues: its balance, and its struggle to occupy a
middle ground. An essay can be so balanced that it becomes bland.
Miller's essay seems to me a case in point: In his effort to give both
the "secular republic" and the "religious nation" positions their
due, Miller ends up saying, it seems, that both positions are approximately right--except to the extent that they say the other position
is wrong. Religion, Miller declares, was not a "necessary foundation" for our republican institutions; but it was "important." It is
hard to know just what this means; such a diagnosis begins to look
less like incisive scholarship and more like academic diplomacy.
If balance can lead to blandness, then blandness can nurture a
kind of shallow complacency. For example, after a useful discussion of the historical transformations that have given shape to current controversies about religious freedom, Harold Berman notes
that these controversies appear in acute form in debates about the
public school curriculum. But he hastily reassures: "Yet it is hard
to imagine that conflicts among religions, as well as conflicts between theistic religions and various forms of so-called secular humanism, could not be presented in a classroom setting openly and
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fairly to all sides." On the contrary, what is hard to imagine, for me
at least, is how Berman can be so sanguine. Nothing in our modem
experience would seem to justify such optimism. 10
Blandness, diplomacy, easy optimism-these qualities recur
throughout the volume. If there is a single unifying theme to the
book, it is that religion can be incorporated into our public philosophy without being offensive. Os Guinness's introduction calls for
the renewal of a "public philosophy" consisting of "a widely shared,
almost universal, agreement on what accords with the common ideals and interests of America and Americans." Although religion
will contribute essentially to this "almost universal" agreement
(perhaps because it is only religion that can promise the miraculous?), the public philosophy will not be a "civil religion" because it
will "not require the common affirmations to be regarded as sacred
or semi-sacred in themselves." The book concludes by reproducing
the Williamsburg Charter, which echoes these themes: Religious beliefs should be permitted to influence public policy, but they should
be presented in a non-inflammatory way and in the form of "publicly accessible claims."
In short, religion should be admitted into public discourse; but
insofar as religion, or a particular religion, may be grounded in
sources that are not "publicly accessible"-sources such as scripture, revelation, or ecclesiastical authority-the price of admission
may involve a sacrifice of the religion's distinctively religious character. But can religion be domesticated in this way? And would
religious believers even want their religious beliefs to be counted on
these terms? One can imagine the proponents of the Williamsburg
Charter pleading with Isaiah or Jeremiah: "Of course we want to
hear what you have to say. But could you please just drop all of the
'Wo unto them's' and 'Thus saith the Lord's.' Some people get offended by that stuff."
One wishes that the contributors had given more careful attention to questions such as these. What underlies the book's "Articles
of Peace" theme is a laudable effort to find common ground in a
diverse society-and a cheerful confidence that common ground is
there for us if we will just try a little harder to be civil with each
other. It would be nice if this were so. But one is entitled to be
skeptical. Such skepticism, however, does not negate the contribution of these essays to the exploration of what in our Republic has
been and is likely to remain a crucial issue of civic self-definition.
10. The William Marty essay in the Weber collection offers an effective antidote to such
complacency on the issue of the school curriculum.

